We present a formal language for specifying distributed authorization policies that communicate through insecure asynchronous media. The language allows us to write declarative authorization policies; the interface between policy decisions and communication events can be specified using guards and policy updates. The attacker, who controls the communication media, is modeled as a message deduction engine. We give trace semantics to communicating authorization policies, and formulate a generic reachability problem. We show that the reachability problem is decidable for a large class of practically-relevant policies specified in our formal language.
In our formalism, we model communicating authorization policies as a finite number of processes. Intuitively, a process represents a PDP. Each process consists of a finite number of threads that share a policy. Threads are finite sequences of communication events; they run in parallel and exchange messages with the threads of other processes over insecure media. The policy of a process is a (declarative) program which models the shared authorization policy that the threads of the process evaluate.
Threads communicate by sending and receiving messages, as is common in asynchronous message passing environments. Each send event is constrained by a guard, and each receive event results in an update of a process' policy. Intuitively, guards and updates belong to the policy level, as opposed to send and receive events which constitute the communication level. See Figure 1 . From an operational point of view, guards are statements that, if derivable from the policy of a process, allow the process to perform a corresponding send action (cf. Dijkstra's guarded command language). Updates are also statements at the policy level. When a process receives a message in one of its threads, it updates its policy correspondingly. Intuitively, updates associate meanings to the messages a process receives in terms of statements at the policy level. For example, a signed X.509 certificate sent by a certificate authority means that the authority endorses the public key and its owner, mentioned in the certificate. We assume an all-powerful attacker who is in direct control of the insecure communication media; see Figure 1 . In fact, the messages the PDPs exchange are passed through the attacker. This is a common (worst-case scenario) assumption in the literature. The message inference capabilities of the attacker may reflect, e.g., the Dolev-Yao threat model [8] . The attacker can indirectly manipulate the policies of the participating PDPs by, e.g., sending tampered messages which affect the update statements.
Contributions. Our main contributions are: (1) We present a formalism for specifying communicating authorization policies, and their hostile environment. (2) We give an algorithm for deciding reachability of communicating authorization policies. Given a formal model of the policy decision points and the attacker, we can decide (under certain conditions, specified precisely in § 4) whether, or not, an (insecure) state is reachable. For instance, questions of the form can the attacker learn the content of a certain file?, or can Ann ever be authorized to access a certain document stored at the file server? are expressible as reachability problems. Note that communication level events, policy level computations, and the interface between the two are all taken into account when deciding reachability. This sets apart our decision algorithm from those for deciding secrecy in security protocols, and those for deciding reachability in dynamic authorization languages (see our related work, § 5).
Structure of the paper. In § 2, we introduce the main features of our formal language with a few examples. The syntax and semantics of the language are formally defined in § 3. In § 4 we identify a set of communicating authorization policies for which the reachability problem is decidable. All proofs are relegated to [9] , due to space constraints. In § 5 we review the related work.
Examples of Communicating Authorization Policies
We introduce the main features of our formalism through three examples. The first example concerns an oauth 2.0 authorization endpoint that is constrained by an rbac system with transitive attributes. The second example pertains to secure delegation of trust for distributing public key certificates. The third example discusses mechanisms for trust and permission revocation.
OAUTH, RBAC and Transitive Attributes
Suppose that Ann wants a remote print service, called RPS, to access (on her behalf) the file brochure.pdf stored on a file server. RPS uses oauth 2.0's Authorization Code Flow protocol [6] to point Ann to the file server where she can authenticate herself and grant RPS access to the file. After Ann authenticates herself to the file server, the file server needs to first check that Ann is authorized to access the file. If so, the file server sends a URI redirect message to Ann's Web browser, along with an authorization code. RPS can use the authorization code to access the file, after authenticating itself at a token endpoint. To keep the example simple, we do not model the entire scenario. Instead, we focus on the file server, which is an oauth 2.0 authorization endpoint.
Suppose that the file server is constrained by an rbac policy with two roles, user and admin. The server stores two sorts of files: public and confidential. Any symbolic link to a public file is deemed public, and any link to a confidential file is deemed confidential. By transitivity, links to "links to confidential (resp. public) files" are confidential (resp. public). Users may access any public file or public link; admins may access any confidential file or link. Admins inherit all the rights attributed to users. A formalization of the file server's policy: K(has role(A, user )) ← K(has role(A, admin)) K(can access(A, F )) ← K(has role(A, user )), K(has attrib(F , public)) K(can access(A, F )) ← K(has role(A, admin)), K(has attrib(F , confid )) K(has attrib(link to(F ), X )) ← K(has attrib(F , X ))
The rules above are Horn clauses. We use capital letters to denote variables, and constants are written with lower-case letters. The predicate symbol K, standing for knows, denotes the knowledge of the file server's policy engine, which "knows" pieces of information; e.g. the file server's policy engine knows that Ann has the role admin. The Horn clauses thereby model the server's information inference rules. For example, the first rule states that the file server knows that if A has the role admin, then A has the role user too, due to the role hierarchy. The second (resp. the third) rule above states that users (resp. admins) can read public (resp. confidential) files. The fourth rule states that links to public (resp. confidential) objects are themselves public (resp. confidential). We will often omit K to avoid unnecessary cluttering.
The extensional policy (or knowledge) of the file server reflects the "current state" of the policy. For example, Ann is an admin, and brochure.pdf is public:
has role(ann, admin) has attrib(brochure.pdf , public)
Now, let us consider the communication between Ann and the file server. After Ann permits RPS to access brochure.pdf, the file server sends back an authorization code to Ann's user agent, e.g. her Web browser. The following guarded send event is part of the file server's thread:
The send event {s 1 , ..., s j }{n 1 , ..., n k } ¬ snd(m) can be executed only if statements s 1 , · · · , s j all follow from the policy, and at least one of n 1 , · · · , n k does not. That is, if the file server's policy implies can access(ann, brochure.pdf ), then an authorization code for the file brochure.pdf is sent to Ann's browser. The authorization code is accompanied with a redirection URI R URI and RPS's state information S INFO . The user agent redirects Ann to RPS, which uses the authorization code to access the requested file after authenticating itself to a token endpoint. Note that, given the policy and extensional knowledge above, the file server can indeed derive can access(ann, brochure.pdf ).
Trust Relations
Ann knows that the root certificate authority RCA is trusted on public keys. Ann asks RCA for Piet's public key. RCA is however temporarily overloaded, and redirects Ann's request to a local certificate authority CA. RCA trusts CA on public keys. CA sends back to Ann a public key of Piet. Here, we focus on two processes: Ann and CA.
The policy of the process CA contains all public keys belonging to Piet in our scenario. CA also stores a set of revoked public keys; for example, the set {is pk of (pk 1 , piet ), is pk of (pk 2 , piet ), is pk of (pk 3 , piet ), is revoked (pk 2 )}. CA signs and sends out valid public keys upon request. The following thread, which is a sequence of two events, within the CA process models this behavior:
rcv(A, P ) {}{} ¬ {is pk of (K , P )}{is revoked (K )} ¬ snd(sig (ca, pk cert (P , K )), sig(rca, is pk certified (ca))) Here CA receives a pair of names A and P: A is asking CA for a public key of P. This message could have been redirected to CA by, e.g., RCA. Receiving this message binds the variables A and P in the rest of the thread. We remark that the events of the thread are executed sequentially. The message neither adds policy statements to CA's extensional knowledge, nor retracts any policy statements; hence the sequence {}{} ¬ after rcv. We come back to this point shortly. Next, the CA sends out the message pk cert (P , K ), signed by CA, denoting that CA endorses K as a valid public key of P . The endorsement is accompanied by a message signed by RCA which certifies that RCA trusts CA on public keys is pk certified (ca) . CA is assumed to have obtained the RCA-signed certificate prior to this exchange.
The CA sends out this message only if:
-CA's policy entails is pk of (K , P ), that is K is a public key of P , and the policy does not entail is revoked (K ), i.e. K has not been revoked.
The variable K, originating in the guard is pk of (K , P ), allows the CA to make a non-deterministic choice. In this example, the CA may choose to send either pk 1 or pk 3 as a valid public key for Piet. The key pk 2 , however, cannot be sent, because it has been revoked according to CA's policy. We turn to Ann's process. The thread that is pertinent to this scenario is given below:
{said (X , is pk of (K , piet )), said (rca, tdon(X , is pk of (K , piet )))}{} ¬ {is pk of (K , piet )}{} ¬ snd(penc(K , payload )) Ann sends out a message (destined to RCA) asking for Piet's public key. The thread is tailored to handle delegation: Ann expects to receive a properly formatted message, signed by an arbitrary process X, given that X has RCA's trust on public keys. Receiving such a message affects the extensional knowledge of Ann. Ann adds two statements to her knowledge:
said (X , is pk of (K , piet )) states that X endorses K as a public key of Piet.
Note that is pk of in this process is local to Ann, i.e. it is independent of the internals of CA's policy, which happens to use the same function symbol for storing public keys and their owners.
said (rca, tdon(X , is pk of (K , piet ))) states that RCA certifies that X is trusted on (denoted tdon) public keys; in particular, any public key associated to Piet.
In general, Ann may interpret a message either by adding policy statements to, or by retracting policy statements from, her extensional knowledge. That is, the receive event rcv(m) {s 1 , ..., s j }{n 1 , ..., n k } ¬ means that upon receiving message m, the statements s 1 , · · · , s j are all added to Ann's extensional knowledge, and n 1 , · · · , n k are all retracted from her extensional knowledge. Let us assume that CA sends the message sig(ca, pk cert (piet , pk 3 )), sig(rca, is pk certified (ca)) to Ann. Then, Ann adds to her knowledge the following statements:
(s 1 ) said (ca, is pk of (pk 3 , piet )) (s 2 ) said (rca, tdon(ca, is pk of (pk 3 , piet )))
We remark that Ann does not retract any part of her extensional knowledge here. We come back to the notion of retraction in § 2.3. Finally, Ann sends the message payload to Piet, encrypted with K , only if Ann knows that K is Piet's public key (asymmetric encryption is denoted penc(·, ·)).
With respect to Ann's policy, we have mentioned above that Ann does not directly trust CA on public keys. She trusts RCA, who delegates its rights w.r.t. endorsing public keys to CA. We model Ann's policy below, where rules are labeled for ease of reference.
The first rule (tr), with no preconditions, models Ann's trust relation: Ann knows that RCA is trusted on (tdon) any public key. The second rule (td) is the essence of transitive trust delegation: If P is trusted on X, then P can delegate this to Q. We remark that delegation of trust need not in general be transitive; see [5] for more on transitive and non-transitive delegation. The third rule (ta) describes trust application: If Ann knows that P said X, and she knows that P is trusted on X, then Ann can infer X. Recall that the left-hand side of the last rule is in fact K(X); the predicate symbol K is suppressed.
Assuming that the statements (s 1 ) and (s 2 ) have been added to Ann's extensional knowledge, we show that Ann's policy would entail: pk 3 is Piet's public key. Thus Ann would send the message payload to Piet encrypted using pk 3 . The following tree, annotated with the names of rules and statements used, shows Ann's deduction steps.
tdon(rca, is pk of (pk 3 , piet )) (tr) tdon(rca, tdon(ca, is pk of (pk 3 , piet ))) (td) tdon(ca, is pk of (pk 3 , piet )) (ta)
is pk of (pk 3 , piet ) (ta)
A typical security goal for this scenario is: would Ann ever send a message encrypted with pk 2 (which has been revoked) to Piet?. Another example: for any key K, if Ann infers that K is Piet's public key, then Ann trusts RCA on 'K is Piet's public key'. These goals can be expressed as reachability decision problems; cf. § 3.3. A side note: the scenario described above is susceptible to replay attacks, because there is no freshness guarantees for the certified keys received by Ann.
Retraction
Retracting policy statements is a feature often needed for modeling revocation of roles and permissions. Consider a hospital where a sensitive ward can be accessed only by the personnel who work in the ward, and have been vaccinated against a particular virus. The PDP that controls access to the ward would then contain a thread of the form:
That is, an access token is sent to U only if U works in the ward (denoted in ward (U )), and U has been vaccinated. The statement that U has been vaccinated is added to the extensional knowledge of the PDP only if the hospital's personnel protection center PPC has put its signature on the message is vaccinated (U ). Now, suppose the vaccination must be repeated every six months. The PDP would then need to inquire PPC about the status of U 's vaccination: whether it is recent or not. Here is a (partial) specification of the thread in the PDP that contacts PPC:
That is, the PDP asks PPC about the vaccination status (v status) of U . The PPC would send back to the PDP a signed message declaring that X's vaccination has been expired. PPC would let X = U if U 's vaccination has been expired; otherwise, PPC lets X be a dummy name. Then, PDP retracts the fact vaccinated (X ) from its policy.
Two remarks are due. First, note that the messages exchanged between PDP and PPC do not have freshness guarantees. Therefore, the attacker can replay these messages, possibly misinforming the PDP about the freshness of the vaccination of the personnel. The second, and perhaps more important, point is that the thread of the PDP that issues access tokens does not synchronize with the PDP thread that contacts the PPC. Therefore, race conditions can arise (or, can be caused by a malicious scheduler) where the access token is issued for a personnel whose vaccination is no longer effective. The first problem can be solved using the standard challenge-response message exchange patterns. The second problem can be solved, e.g., using a lock inside the PDP policy engine. This point is further discussed below.
Synchronization. In order to enforce synchronization inside the PDP, we can use a shared lock between the two threads. This can be modeled as:
Upon receiving a request from U , PDP's thread 1 locks the user U internally. The lock can be released only by thread 2 of the PDP who contacts the PPC to check the status of U 's vaccination. The execution of thread 1 can then resume, only if thread 2 has not retracted the statement "U is vaccinated". 1
Propagating Revocations. As mentioned above, retracting policy statements if used without the necessary synchronization mechanisms can be futile. This point is also relevant to how revocations are propagated in distributed settings. For instance, consider the file server of § 2.1. Recall that Ann has the role admin in the file server. Ann may therefore access any public file. Suppose that Ann's admin role is revoked after the file server has sent out the authorization code to RPS. After the revocation, Ann does not have the role user in the file server, because her user role was due to her admin role, which is revoked. That is, the revocation is cascaded locally on the file server: all that followed from Ann being an admin is retracted after the revocation. The semantics of retraction in our formalism is cascading [11] : if a is entailed due to b, and only due to b, then retracting b would mean that a will not be entailed by the policy; see the semantics, § 3.2. RPS may however use the authorization code issued by the file server to communicate with a token endpoint, hence accessing the file brochure.pdf on behalf of Ann. Meanwhile, Ann herself can no longer access the file. That is, in distributed settings, such as the scenario of § 2.1, revocations do not propagate automatically. To ensure that revocations take effect globally, synchronization mechanisms (e.g. through message passing, using shared objects) are necessary.
Careless uses, and unintentional effects, of retraction can be detected by checking reachability. For instance, in this example one could check that after the revocation Ann cannot access brochure.pdf , while a state in which RPS can access the file is reachable. Deciding reachability is thus crucial for understanding communicating policies.
(Un)Ambiguous Policies. A form of careless use of retraction is when the policy becomes ambiguous about rights. This point is best explained with an example:
Suppose that the policy of a library service states that any student can access the reading groups schedule file schedule.pdf , formalized as:
can access(U , schedule.pdf ) ← is student(U ). Now, imagine upon receiving a complaint about Ann, who is a student, the library service retracts her permission to access schedule.pdf :
The retraction is meant to prevent Ann from accessing the file, while the fact that she is a student implies that she may access the file. This is an ambiguity in the policy engine. In the semantics of our formalism ( § 3.2), the Horn rule trumps the retraction, because policies are seen as invariants of the process (cf. the specification language ASLan [12] ). That is, Ann would be able to access the file, despite "retracting" her access. For enforcing the retraction, either the fact is student(U ) should be retracted (which would be too harsh a reaction to an unsigned complaint), or the guard for accessing the file should be refined to explicitly exclude those about whom a complaint has been received.
We remark that retractions in our formalism respect the semantics of Griffiths and Wade [13] : if a policy statement is added to the extensional knowledge of a process, and subsequently the same statement is retracted, the policy remains unchanged. Due to Horn rules, however, retracting policy statements that do not belong to the extensional knowledge is inconsequential, as the example above shows. Adding and retracting policy statements, through updates, indeed affect only the extensional knowledge of the processes; see § 3.2.
Formalizing Communicating Authorization Policies
We formally define the syntax ( § 3.1) and semantics ( § 3.2) of our language. We define the reachability problem ( § 3.3) for communicating authorization policies.
Syntax
A (first-order) signature is a tuple (Σ, V, P), where Σ is a countable set of functions, V is a countable set of variables, and P is a finite set of predicate symbols. These three sets are pairwise disjoint. We use capital letters A, B, . . . to refer to the elements of V. The free term algebra induced by Σ, with variables in V, is denoted T Σ(V) . A message is a ground term, i.e. an element of T Σ(∅) . The set of atoms is defined as {p(t 1 , · · · , t n ) | p ∈ P, t i ∈ T Σ(V) , arity of p is n}. A fact is an atom with no variables. In the following we fix a signature (Σ, V, P).
An event is either a send event or a receive event. A send event is of the form g snd(m), where g is a guard and m is a term. A receive event is of the form rcv(m) u, where m is a term and u is an update. A guard g is of the form g ∃ g ∃ , where g ∃ and g ∃ are disjoint finite sets of atoms. An update u is of the form u + u − , where u + and u − are disjoint finite sets of atoms. We refer to g ∃ (resp. u + ) as a positive guard (resp. update), and to g ∃ (resp. u − ) as a negative guard (resp. update). In the examples of § 2 we have superscripted negative guards and negative updates with ¬ to improve readability.
A thread t is a finite sequence of events t = e 1 , · · · , e n , n ≥ 0. For a variable v appearing in thread t, we say the event e i , with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the origin of v in t iff i is the smallest index of the events in which v appears. In the remainder of the paper we only consider threads t that satisfy the origination property: for any variable v appearing in t the following holds.
if the origin of v is the event rcv(m) u + u − , then either v appears in m, or v appears in u − and v does not appear elsewhere in the thread; -if the origin of v is the event g ∃ g ∃ snd(m), then either v appears in g ∃ , or v appears in g ∃ and v does not appear elsewhere in the thread.
A process π is a tuple (η π , Ω π , I π ), where η π is a finite set of threads, Ω π is a finite set of facts, called the extensional knowledge or extensional policy of π, and I π is a finite set of Horn clauses, called the policy of π. A Horn clause is of the form a ← a 1 , · · · , a n , with n ≥ 0 and a, a 1 , · · · , a n being atoms. An attacker model A is a pair (Ω A , A ), where Ω A is a finite set of messages, called the extensional knowledge of the attacker, and A , referred to as the policy of the attacker, is a subset of 2 T Σ(∅) × T Σ(∅) ; intuitively, M A m means that the attacker can derive message m, given the finite set M of messages. The attacker is thus identified in our model with her extensional knowledge (which stores the set of the messages observed by the attacker) and her policy (which encodes the deduction capabilities of the attacker). Moreover, the attacker is able to send and receive messages; these capabilities are reflected in the execution model § 3.2.
We are now ready to define communicating authorization policies, hereafter referred to as caps. A cap is a tuple ((Σ, V, P), π 1 , · · · , π , A), where (Σ, V, P) is a signature, π 1 , · · · , π are (honest) processes and A is an attacker model, all defined using the signature (Σ, V, P). To avoid trivial name clashes, variables appearing in different threads are assumed to be distinct.
Semantics
For a finite set H of Horn clauses, a fact a and a finite set T of facts, we write T H a iff a belongs to the closure of T under H. We write T H T , for a finite set of facts T , iff T H a for all a ∈ T . Let A be a set of atoms. Define A↓ as the set of all facts, i.e. ground atoms, that can be obtained by applying a substitution to the elements of A.
Given a process π = (η π , Ω π , I π ), we use π as a shorthand for Iπ , and we refer to the set {a | Ω π π a} as the knowledge of π. That is, the knowledge of π is the set of facts that can be inferred from the extensional knowledge of π using its policy. The knowledge of the attacker (Ω A , A ) is the set {m | Ω A A m}. A configuration of cap = ((Σ, V, P), π 0 1 , · · · , π 0 , A 0 ) is an + 1 tuple where the first elements are processes, and the last element is an attacker model. The initial configuration of cap is the tuple (π 0 1 , · · · , π 0 , A 0 ). We define trace semantics for caps. Let Z be the set of all configurations of cap, i.e. the set of all tuples of the form z = (π 1 , · · · , π , A). We define the relation → ⊆ Z × E × Z as: (z, e, z ) ∈ → iff z = (π 1 , · · · , π i , · · · , π , A), z = (π 1 , · · · , π i , · · · , π , A ), A = (Ω A , A ), π i = (η, Ω, I) and p = e · p ∈ η for some thread p and 1 ≤ i ≤ , and one of the following conditions hold: ∪ {p σ}, Ω, I) , for some substitution σ that satisfies the following conditions:
• g ∃ σ is a set of facts and Ω πi g ∃ σ.
• If g ∃ is non-empty, then there exists no substitution σ s.t.
for some substitution σ such that tσ is a message and Ω A A tσ.
We write z e → z for (z, e, z ) ∈→. A trace of cap is an alternating sequence of configurations and events of the form z 0 e 1 z 1 · · · z n−1 e n z n , with n ≥ 0, such that z 0 is the initial configuration of cap and z i−1 ei → z i for all i ∈ [1, n] . The semantics of the cap is defined as the set of all its traces. We say that configuration z is reachable in cap iff there exists a trace z 0 e 1 z 1 · · · e n z n in the semantics of cap with n ≥ 0 and z = z n .
Note that the extensional knowledge of the processes and the attacker in any reachable configuration of cap are indeed sets of facts (i.e. they do not contain variables). This is due to the origination property and the conditions the semantics enforces on substitutions.
An important feature of our formalism, not covered in § 2, is the variables that originate in negative guards or updates. This is described below.
Variables originating in negative guards or updates, and SoD. Consider a hospital data center HDC that receives a message from the hospital's human resources department HR stating that a doctor has retired. The following thread of HDC models this event:
rcv(sig(hr , retired (D ))) {}{patient of (P , D )} ¬ That is, after receiving the message, HDC retracts the statements patient of (P , D ) for all patients P . In other words, after D has retired, no patient can be considered as his/her patient. That is, the variables that originate in negative updates are interpreted universally (see the semantics). It is therefore natural that such variables cannot be referred to in the rest of the thread; see the origination property. We remark that variables cannot originate in positive updates. Now we turn to the variables that originate in negative guards. Suppose that HDC receives a report R from a medical personnel P . To review the report, the report may be forwarded to any doctor D who does not work in the same ward as P . The following thread models this scenario.
rcv(penc(pk (hdc), sig (P , report (R)))) {}{} ¬ {is doctor(D)}{in ward(P, W ), in ward(D, W )} ¬ snd(penc(pk (D ), please review (R)))
Here, in ward (X , W ) means that X works in ward W , pk (X) is a public key of process X. The variable W originates in a negative guard. Therefore, according to the semantics given above, this guard is satisfied for any D such that: (as in § 2, we omit the predicate symbol K, i.e. knows, around these terms to simplify the presentation)
The guard is satisfied for D only when there is no instantiation for W where both D and P work in ward W . Variables originating in negative guards can therefore not be referred to elsewhere in the thread; see the origination property. Similarly, separation of duty (SoD) can be expressed in our formalism. Two tasks T 1 and T 2 are constrained under an SoD relation iff no single principal is allowed to perform them both. In general, SoD relations must be anti-reflexive and symmetric. Consider the following guarded send event:
An authorization token to perform task T 1 is issued for A only if -A is allowed to perform T 1 , denoted can do(A, T 1 ). -There exists no task T 2 such that T 2 has been performed by A, denoted has done(A, T 2 ), and there is a SoD constraint on tasks T 1 and T 2 , denoted is sod (T 1 , T 2 ). That is,
In case the authorization code to perform T 1 is sent to A, the fact has done(A, T 1 ) should be added (via update statements) to the extensional knowledge of the process that enforces SoD, after A has performed the task. This is necessary to keep a complete record of the tasks that have been performed. Note that, if needed, changes in the SoD relation can be expressed using positive and negative updates in our formalism.
The Reachability Decision Problem
Fix a cap, defined as cap = ((Σ, V, P), π 1 , · · · , π , A). A goal G for cap is an
. Intuitively, goals are conditions on the knowledge of the processes and the attacker: the knowledge of π i must entail f i , and m should belong to the knowledge of the attacker. The reachability problem Reach cap, G asks whether, or not, there exists a reachable configuration ((η 1 , Ω 1 ), · · · , (η , Ω ), Ω A ) in cap such that ∀i ∈ [1, ] .
These cases are, resp., denoted by Reach cap, G = T and Reach cap, G = F.
As a convention, we may write Reach cap, π : f or Reach cap, A : m when we are interested only in the knowledge of process π, or the knowledge of the attacker A. This can be obviously reduced to the reachability problem defined above, by adding dummy facts/messages to the knowledge of the processes/attacker whose knowledge is of no interest to us. Similarly, reachability for generic guards can be reduced to Reach; see [9] . Due to the semi-decidability of Horn clauses, Reach is in general undecidable. In § 4 we identify a set of caps for which Reach is decidable.
Decidable Communicating Authorization Policies
In this section, we identify a set of caps specified in our formal language for which Reach is decidable. We refer to this set as DC. Intuitively, a cap belongs to DC iff the following conditions hold: (1) The policies of honest processes are written in a fragment of Horn theories, hereafter called AL, formally defined below. AL stands for authorization logic. (2) The attacker has the capabilities of the standard Dolev-Yao (DY) attacker [8] . The Dolev-Yao attacker intercepts and remembers all transmitted messages, it can encrypt, decrypt and sign messages if it knows the corresponding keys, it can compose and send new messages using the messages it has observed, and can remove or delay messages in favor of others being communicated.
First, we introduce the notion of infons, adopted from [5] . Infons are pieces of information, e.g. can read (piet , file12 ) stipulating that Piet can read a certain file12 . An infon does not admit a truth value, i.e. it is never false or true. Instead, infons are the interface between the communication level and policy level for honest processes. The simplest form of an infon is constructed by applying wrappers to message terms. For example, if the message term n is a nonce, then the wrapper is fresh can be used to construct the piece of information is fresh(n), denoting that the nonce n is fresh. More interesting infons are constructed by applying infon constructor functions to other infons (and messages). For example, said (π, is fresh(n)) is an infon that states that process π said that n is a fresh nonce. Then, said (π , said (π, is fresh(n))) is the infon that states that process π said that: process π said that n is fresh.
In the following, for any signature (Σ, V, P) we assume Σ = Σ msg Σ infon and V = V msg V infon , where Σ msg is the set of message constructor functions, and Σ infon is the set of infon constructors. The notation stands for the union of disjoint sets. Two types of terms are generated by Σ: message terms, and infons (defined formally below). We assume that the elements of Σ infon are associated with types: each function symbol f ∈ Σ infon of arity n specifies the types of its n arguments. Formally, the elements of T Σmsg (Vmsg ) are called message terms, and have the type msg. The set Infons is the smallest set that contains V infon and s.t. f (t 1 , · · · , t n ) ∈ Infons for any f ∈ Σ infon of arity n, and t i being of the correct type. The elements of Infons have the type infon. An infon constructor function whose arguments are all of type msg is called a wrapper function. the types msg and infon are disjoint. Any element of T Σ(V) that is not a message or infon is considered ill-typed, hence ignored in our study.
We introduce the AL theories in order to model the policies of honest processes. 2 In AL, the policy statements for honest processes (i.e. facts derived from the processes' policies) are predicates over infons. Definition 1. Let T be a finite set of Horn clauses, where any clause in T is of the form p(t) ← p 1 (t 1 ),· · ·, p (t ), with ≥ 0, p, p 1 , · · · , p ∈ P, and t, t 1 , · · · , t ∈ Infons. T is an AL theory iff T = T ← T → where (a) The set rewrite system R T← = {a ⇒ a 1 · · · a n | a ← a 1 , · · · , a n ∈ T ← } induced by T ← is terminating, i.e. it does not admit reduction sequences of infinite length. (b) For each clause p(t) ← p 1 (t 1 ),· · ·, p (t ) in T → , at least one of the t j , with j ∈ [1, ] , is an anchor for the clause; that is: -var (t j ) contains all the variables appearing in the clause, and all the variables in t j are infon variables (i.e. elements of V infon ), and p j (t j ) unifies with no atom in T , except for itself and p(t), and the term rewriting system {t j ⇒ t} induced by the clause is terminating.
It is easy to observe that all the policies defined in § 2 belong to AL; for instance, for the the example of § 2.2, T is partitioned into T ← = {tr, td } and T → = {ta}. For more detail, see [9] . Below, we define a set DC of caps for which we prove Reach is decidable.
The set DC consists of all the caps ((Σ, V, P), π 1 , · · · , π , A) that satisfy the following conditions:
-(Σ, V, P) is a signature, with Σ = Σ msg Σ infon , and:
• Σ msg contains the functions penc(·, ·), {|·| } · , sig(·, ·), pk(·), sk(·), h(·), (·, ·), representing the usual cryptographic primitives. Namely, they represent respectively asymmetric and symmetric encryption, digital signature, public key and private key constructors, hash and pairing functions. -For any process π = (η 0 π , Ω 0 π , I π ): • I π is an AL theory.
• Atoms in Ω 0 π , in guards and in updates are of the form p(i), where p ∈ P and i is an infon; i.e. the knowledge of the process ranges over infons.
• Variables in the guards and updates range over messages, i.e. they are always under the application of a wrapper function symbol. • In all the events g snd(m) and rcv(m) u, m ∈ T Σmsg (V) ; i.e. participants send and receive message terms, as opposed to infons.
where Ω 0 A is a finite subset of T Σmsg (∅) , and A reflects the capabilities of the standard Dolev-Yao attacker, defined, e.g., in [14] .
The proof of the following theorem can be found in [9] . Theorem 1. Reach cap, G is decidable for any cap in DC, and any goal G.
Related Work
The closest related works are (1) dynamic authorization logics, and (2) security protocols annotated with authorization constraints.
(1) Dynamic authorization logics. Existing distributed authorization logics, such as [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , cannot express the dynamic aspects of distributed policies. We, in contrast, model communicating authorization policies which change due to communication events. Our formalism allows therefore for modeling the dynamic aspects of distributed (i.e. communicating) authorization policies. This is the fundamental difference between our formalism and the dynamic authorization logics that confine their analysis to a centralized policy decision point, such as [15] [16] [17] [18] .
We decide reachability in communicating authorization policies by taking into account the "low-level" cryptographic protocols that implement the policies, and also the interface between the low-level protocols and the policies. This is in contrast to the dynamic authorization logics that model the causes and effects of policy changes at the same level of abstraction as the policy, such as [19, 20] . These logics hence abstract away the mechanisms through which policy decision points communicate and possibly influence each other. For instance, the notion of updates in our language is close to the notion of effects in [19, 20] . We however do not associate effects to policy decisions; rather, effects (or updates) are associated with receiving messages. What we call a guarded send event in our formalism has no counterpart in [19, 20] . In our decision algorithm, we not only take into account the asynchronous communications among the policy decision points, but also we can explicitly model the capabilities of the hostile entity (e.g. the Dolev-Yao [8] attacker) that controls their communications.
(2) Security protocols annotated with authorization constraints. Our formalism is related to the body of research on annotating security protocols with authorization constraints [7, 12, [21] [22] [23] [24] . None of these works (except for [7] ) give an algorithm for deciding reachability. In contrast, we can decide reachability for a large class of authorization policies. We extend the decidability result of [7] in two directions: (a) We have negative statements in guards, and we allow the policy statements to be retracted from the extensional policies of the processes. These features enable us to naturally model non-monotonic behaviors, such as revocation of rights. (b) We give a decision algorithm for a rich set of policies AL, which strictly subsumes the type-1 policy theories of [7] .
